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1 Introduction
In the canonical competitive labour market model, ﬁrms' and consumers' re-
sponses to taxes emerge from the relative sizes of the elasticities of supply and
demand. As ﬁrms have the ability to pass taxes onto consumers through higher
prices, it is irrelevant whether taxes are formally levied on the consumer or the
producer. In this model, statutory incidence is not a useful economic concept
(Salanié, 2011).
Recent work has suggested meaningful departures from this `invariance of
incidence' proposition in both labour and product markets. Chetty et al. (2009)
ﬁnd tax-exclusive price labelling increases retailer proﬁtability, and thus that
tax salience aﬀects real outcomes. Kopczuk et al. (2016) provide convinc-
ing evidence that statutory incidence matters if some agents are better at
evasion than others, while Saez et al. (2012) shows that employers compen-
sate workers aﬀected by a cohort-based payroll tax reform for employer but
not employee contributions. In a lab experiment, Weber and Schram (2017)
ﬁnd diﬀerential extensive-margin labour supply responses to income taxes and
dollar-equivalent payroll taxes.
This paper provides a similar point of departure for tax `notches', thresholds
where tax liabilities increase discontinuously. Tax notches have been used
extensively to estimate behavioural responses (e.g. Kleven and Waseem, 2013;
Sallee and Slemrod, 2012) but with some notable exceptions (e.g. Blinder and
Rosen, 1985) less has been done on their theoretical properties.
The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is to show that the standard theoretical
results on statutory incidence need not hold when tax schedules have discrete
jumps. In a labour market setting, we show that tax liabilities for wages
near notch thresholds diﬀer for payroll (employer) taxes compared to income
(employee) taxes. Intuitively, the discontinuous nature of notches creates a
region that would generate positive payroll tax liabilities but zero income tax
liabilities. This implies a prediction of diﬀerential adjustments to employer
and employee taxes around notch thresholds.
Secondly, we exploit quasi-experimental variation to test our theoretical
2
predictions. An ideal experiment to test whether statutory incidence matters
would be separate exogenous shifts in the employee and employer tax sched-
ules. Our quasi-experimental environment provides a setting like this. The
social security tax schedule in Ireland contains multiple notches which discon-
tinuously increase statutory liabilities on either employees (via decreased pay)
or employers (via increased gross costs).
The speciﬁcs of this policy facilitate a novel test of the invariance of out-
comes to statutory incidence.The social security tax (Pay Related Social Insur-
ance, or PRSI) splits contributions1 into a portion that shall be payable [by
the] employer, and a portion that will be to the exclusion of the employee.
These separate schedules face discontinuous notches at diﬀerent thresholds.
For example, crossing a e339 per week earnings threshold in 2007 increased
employee contributions by e8.48 per week (e440 per year, 2.5% of income)
while crossing a e356 per week threshold increased employer contributions by
e8.01 per week (e416 per year, 2.25% of income).
We investigate short-run responses to these notches using administrative
linked employer-employee earnings data. Consistent with our model we ﬁnd
clear evidence of earnings responding to this incentive, but only when levied
formally on employees. We ﬁnd very little evidence of earnings responses when
the tax is formally levied on employers. Earnings are much more responsive to
increases in `employee taxes' than to comparable increases in `employer taxes'.
This is striking because in both cases, the tax is remitted fully by the
employer. Citing diﬀerential ability to evade taxes across the supply-chain,
Kopczuk et al. (2016) ﬁnd tax collections for state diesel taxes increased
when the physical requirement of remitting the tax shifted from distributors
to wholesalers. In this setting, there is no diﬀerence in evasion possibilities
between the taxes. Employers calculate the combined employee and employer
contributions due and remit this to the tax authority (the Revenue Commis-
sioners). The only diﬀerence in who the tax is statutorily incident on: the
employee, or the employer.
This is precisely the situation where one might expect that the canonical in-
1Section 13(2)(d) of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act, 2005.
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variance of incidence result should hold. We show it does not. If tax schedules
are discontinuous, as they are with notches, then taxes formally levied on em-
ployees does not necessarily result in the same equilibrium as dollar-equivalent
taxes on formally levied on employers.
To investigate further, we empirically analyze the determinants of respon-
siveness. Using the tax return data, we decompose earnings responses to see
if behaviour is driven by the characteristics of the employee, of the employer,
or both. Self-employment income, or working in the construction sector, for
example, are good predictors of reporting a tax-advantaged income. How-
ever, we ﬁnd that these predictors systematically diﬀer between employee- and
employer-taxes. A suite of variables are found to be relevant for the employee
tax, but only a single predictor  the form of incorporation  is a robust
determinant of employer tax responsiveness. Thus earnings are not only less
sensitive to employer-focused taxes, they appear to be determined by diﬀerent
factors. Employee characteristics only predict behaviour when the statutory
burden falls on that employee.
The most similar paper to ours is perhaps Lehmann et al. (2013) which
ﬁnds diﬀerential responses in France to income taxes than to payroll taxes,
suggesting sticky posted wages as a mechanism. We do not rely on market
frictions as an explanation but rather show the circumstances when the text-
book results do not hold for notches. In an important contribution, Saez et al.
(2012) ﬁnds ﬁrms do not pass payroll taxes onto employees in the manner sug-
gested by the standard theory. More recently, Weber and Schram (2017) ﬁnds
non-equivalence between payroll and income taxes in a laboratory setting.
The paper carries considerable implications for both policy and the existing
literature. From a policy perspective, it highlights the importance of admin-
istrative concerns for substantive economic outcomes. To a lesser degree, it
provides support for real-world cases where statute formally states the desired
legislative eﬀect of taxes. In terms of existing academic work, the paper adds
to the growing literature underscoring deviations from classical tax theory re-
sults. We believe this is the ﬁrst time the conditions when statutory incidence
applies to tax notches has been formalized. We provide empirical evidence
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supporting the result of non-equivalence, and highlight speciﬁc ways responses
diﬀer between notches on employees and employers.
Section 2 outlines the theoretical component of the paper, formally applying
statutory incidence analysis to notches. Section 3 discusses the institutional
details of PRSI, with Section 4 providing an overview of the administrative
dataset used. Section 5 comprises the empirical analysis which ﬁnd diﬀerential
magnitudes of responses and mechanisms underpinning them, while Section 6
concludes.
2 Theory
Economists have known since at least Cournot (1838) that taxes are partly
shifted from the remitter to another person in the transaction. The standard
incidence results comprise several inter-related predictions: that the identity
of the remitter does not aﬀect revenue; that the dollar-value of the tax deﬁnes
the extent of the response, not whether it is administered on a gross cost or
net price basis; and that the elasticities of supply and demand allocate relative
burdens (Gruber, 2005). This section outlines the extent to which these results
apply to `notches', discontinuous increases in tax liabilities.
Our focus is whether the result of statutory invariance is robust to admin-
istration on a gross cost versus net price basis. To match the empirical section
that follows we will focus on a labour market example.2 We will see that
the textbook equilibrium predictions pertain when the tax notch is adminis-
tered on a gross cost (i.e. payroll tax) basis, but will not in general pertain
when calculated/administered on a net pay (i.e. income tax) basis. Intuitively,
the discontinuous nature of notches can push net pay below the tax threshold.
This implies the standard after-tax predictions do not constitute a well-deﬁned
equilibrium, as no tax is due. No such eﬀects occur when the notches are ad-
ministered on a gross cost basis, as the tax can only increase the gross cost.
DenoteW as the gross cost of wages to an employer, and w as the net wage
to the employee. Absent taxation, W = w. Deﬁne a payroll tax t such that
2The analysis applies equally to regular commodities.
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W = (1 + t)w, and an income tax τ such that w = (1− τ)W .
Proposition 1 If tax liabilities are continuous, the distribution of incidence
with a payroll tax t is equivalent to that of an income tax τ where t and τ are
isomorphic.
Proof Consider an income tax τ > 0 that relates the net wage of employee
w to the gross cost of employment W by the equation w = (1− τ)W . Taking
logs of this equation gives us log(w) = log(1 − τ) + log(W ) which, when
diﬀerentiated, gives us
dw
w
= − dτ
(1− τ) +
dW
W
Using the `hat' notation as per Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) to deﬁne a pro-
portional change e.g. Wˆ = dW
W
, we see a relationship between net wage, (net
of) tax rates, and gross costs such that:
wˆ = −τˆ + Wˆ (1)
Shifting gears slightly, deﬁne the elasticity of labour supply ηS = dL
S/LS
dw/w
=
L̂S
wˆ
which implies
L̂S = ηSwˆ (2)
Analogously deﬁne the elasticity of labour demand ηD = dL
D/LD
dW/W
= L̂
D
Wˆ
which
makes it clear that
L̂D = ηDWˆ (3)
Reaching a new equilibrium implies Equation 2 must equal Equation 3,
L̂S = L̂D = ηDWˆ = ηSwˆ, and therefore from Equation 1,
wˆ = −τˆ + η
S
ηD
wˆ
=
(
ηD
ηS − ηD
)
(τˆ) (4)
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and, also from Equation 1, the complementary:
Wˆ = wˆ + τˆ
=
ηD
ηS
Wˆ + τˆ
=
(
ηS
ηS − ηD
)
(τˆ) (5)
Now consider a payroll tax t > 0 relating gross costs W to net wages by
W
(1+t)
= w. Using the same method that gets us Equation 1, we have
Wˆ = tˆ+ wˆ. (6)
which is functionally equivalent to Equation 1. The same results proceed, e.g.:
Wˆ = −tˆ+ η
D
ηS
Wˆ
=
(
ηS
ηS − ηD
)
(tˆ) (7)
Comparing Equation 5 to Equation 7, we see the equivalence between a payroll
tax t and an income tax t. 
This is the textbook result (e.g. Gruber, 2005) that it does not matter
whether the tax is placed on consumers or producers or, in this speciﬁc case,
as a payroll tax or an income tax. From the starting points of W = (1 + t)w
and w = (1−τ)W note that we can rewrite the problem redeﬁning τ ≡ t/(1+t)
and it is clear that Proposition 1 follows.
Less well-understood are incidence results for notches. Consider a job that
pays a wage rate of W0 prior to the introduction of a notch. Denote as W
as the after-tax gross cost of wages to an employer, and w as the after-tax
net wage to the employee. Absent taxation, W = w = W0. Now consider a
notch threshold, N , exceeding which triggers a lump-sum payroll tax TP > 0.
Deﬁne an equilibrium as a pair of gross wages (W ) and net wages (w) such
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that W − TP = w, where
Payroll Tax Liability =
0 if W ≤ NTP > 0 otherwise
and that these wages {W,w} are deviations from W0 that are consistent with
the underlying supply and demand elasticities. Our objective is to determine
the equilibrium values ofW and w, i.e. the distribution of incidence in the case
of notches.
Proposition 2 The distribution of incidence of a notched payroll tax TP
can be expressed in terms of the incidence results of a continuous payroll tax
t.
Proof To analyze non-continuous taxes we start with the accounting
identity that
W = w + TP
The ﬁrst element of this proof is establishing incidence. The setup here TP > 0
is functionally equivalent to the unit/speciﬁc tax analysis in textbooks such as
Musgrave (1959). Noting that W −W0 equals the change in wage employers
pay, we can derive incidence in terms of the initial wage W0. Speciﬁcally, the
after-tax gross cost of employment W will equal:
W = W0 +
(
ηS
ηS − ηD
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
TP
as per Chapter 1 of Salanié (2011) on the incidence of a speciﬁc tax. The net
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wage (w) is:
w = W − TP = W0 +
(
ηS
ηS − ηD
)
TP − TP
= W0 +
(
ηD
ηS − ηD
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
TP (8)
The change in wage Wˆ = W −W0 = w + TP −W0 can then be expressed as:
Wˆ =
(
ηS
ηS − ηD
)
TP
which is equivalent to (a ﬁrst-order approximation of) Equation 7 
An illustrative example here will be useful to compare against the result in
Proposition 3.
Example Suppose W0 = 105, N = 100, that magnitudes of elasticities of
supply and demand are equal (i.e. that |ηS| = |ηD|), and that TP = 20, i.e.
Payroll Tax Liability TP =
0 if W ≤ 10020 otherwise
Equal elasticities imply
∣∣ηD/ (ηS − ηD)∣∣ = 1
2
and so the burden of the tax will
be shared evenly. Then w = W0 − 12(TP ) = 95 and W = w + TP = 115.
This represents a coherent equilibrium where the tax is the diﬀerence between
W and w, and the departures from W0 are consistent with the underlying
elasticities.
Proposition 3 The economic incidence of a notched income tax TI need
not equal the economic incidence of a dollar-equivalent notched payroll tax TP .
Proof (By contradiction) Suppose W0 = 105, N = 100, that magnitudes
of elasticities of supply and demand are equal (i.e. that |ηS| = |ηD|), and that
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TI = 20.
Income Tax Liability TI =
0 if w ≤ 10020 otherwise
Note the subtle diﬀerence between this setup and the example above. In the
example, the payroll tax liability TP is a function W ≤ 100. Here, the income
tax TI liability is a function of w ≤ 100.
Equal elasticities again imply the burden of the tax will be shared evenly,
and from the example in Proposition 2 w = 95 and W = 115. However as
w < 100, from the deﬁnition of TI we see that no tax is due. The absence of
tax implies w
!
= W , which is not true under the conditions proposed. This is a
contradiction, and the proposed values do not represent a coherent equilibrium.
The incidence of TI diﬀers from the incidence of TP . 
We can derive bounds for when the result illustrated in Proposition 3 holds.
Consider an initial wage W0 ∈ (N,N + TI). This is where the prevailing wage
W0 strictly exceeds the notch threshold, but not `by much'. We will show in
Proposition 4 that in this situation it matters whether the tax is deﬁned by
the gross cost (W ) or net wage (w). In the setting where the tax due formula
is deﬁned not by the employer cost W but by the employee beneﬁt w, the
formula in Equation 8 above (w = W0 +
(
ηD
ηS−ηD
)
TI) generates circumstances
where no tax is due. That is, holding remittance obligations constant, a form
of statutory incidence aﬀects real outcomes.
Proposition 4 For any ﬁnite and non-zero elasticities of supply and de-
mand ηS, ηD ∈ R6=0, there are points in the income distribution `close enough'
to a notch threshold N where the incidence of a notched income tax TI does
not equal the incidence of a dollar-equivalent notched payroll tax TP .
Proof For W0 ∈ (N,N + TI) one of two possible scenarios must prevail.
Noting that W0−N is how far above the notch threshold the initial wage was,
it must be the case that either:
W0 −N >
∣∣∣∣( ηDηS − ηD
)
TI
∣∣∣∣
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or
W0 −N ≤
∣∣∣∣( ηDηS − ηD
)
TI
∣∣∣∣
In the ﬁrst case, there is a relatively large gap between the pre-tax wage
W0 and the notch threshold N . In this case it follows from Equation 8 that
w > N . That implies that even the relatively low price w, the wage that
accrues to the worker, is above the notch threshold. In this case the tax is due,
and the regular incidence results hold.
However in the second case, there is a relatively small gap between the
pre-tax wage W0 and the notch threshold N . By the same logic from Equation
8 as in the preceding paragraph, w ≤ N . This means the wage accruing to the
worker w, on which the tax is based, falls below the threshold N . No tax is
due.
Indeed, for any given elasticities (and thus any given
∣∣∣( ηDηS−ηD)TI∣∣∣ = δ) we
can ﬁnd a W0 close enough to the threshold such that W0 −N =  < δ, where
the tax is not due. 
When tax law is statutorily on the employee, there is always a range of
pre-tax wages when the laws of invariance do not hold. In the range depicted
in the ﬁrst scenario, where the initial wage is adequately above N , the after-tax
wage w remains above the notch threshold and the standard formulae apply.
However in the second scenario, where the initial wage is `close enough'
to N , tax notches can force such a divergence from original prices that the
notches are self-defeating in a revenue sense. Intuitively, if the tax wedge
pushes the employee beneﬁt below the notch threshold, then no tax is due. In
this case, the standard formulae do not generate a coherent equilibrium. This
is the key diﬀerence between discontinuous taxes (notches) and the usual ad
valorem incidence results we ﬁnd in textbooks. Notches' discontinuous nature
are diﬀerent.
We can provide the intuition of the result with a graphical analysis. See
Figure 1 below. It depicts a standard market equilibrium with a tax.
Without a notch, the equilibrium is quantity L1 with a wedge between gross
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Figure 1: Graphical depiction of the result
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wages and net wages equal to the amount of the tax. The notch threshold at
N changes the analysis. If the tax is levied on the employer-side (W ), then
the price is above the notch threshold, and the textbook case prevails. If the
tax is levied on the employee's side of things, then the relevant price (w) is
below the threshold and the tax is not due. For any notch and elasticities,
there are wages close enough to the cut-oﬀ point that the net wage is below
the threshold.
Absent the standard equilibrium conditions pertaining, it is natural to ask
what predictions can be made. In this second scenario, where tax liability is
statutorily on the employee-side and where wages are only slightly above the
notch threshold, mutually beneﬁcial (Pareto improving) agreements/bargains
exist for the employee and employer. The most obvious such bargain is where
gross wages adjust to just avoid the tax, i.e. w = W = N . Relative to the
case where a tax must be paid, this bargain would leave both employer and
employer better oﬀ.3
Note the crucial distinction between when the tax increases gross costs
versus decreases net pay. In the gross cost case and in the net pay case where
3Of course, this is just one such agreement from a class of potential agreements.
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wages are far above the notch, the standard incidence results constitute a
coherent equilibrium. Although mutually beneﬁcial bargains may still exist,
the standard equilibrium results are a reasonable starting-point for predicting
behaviour. However, in the net pay case when the wage is close enough to the
notch threshold, the standard equilibrium will not pertain. The distribution
of after-tax burdens predicted by standard economic theory simply does not
hold, as no tax is owed. We thus do not expect equivalent adjustments in the
net pay (Employee notch) case as the gross cost (Employer notch) case. To
the extent that markets tend to adjust to equilibrium conditions, we expect
the gross cost case to adjust as standard theory predicts, but expect `new'
adjustment behaviour (such as the Pareto-improving bargain w = W = N) to
occur in the net pay case.
The empirical analysis that follows tests these predictions. We will ﬁrst
investigate whether earnings responses diﬀer between the gross cost and net pay
cases. As discussed above, the responses do diﬀer: we will see clear evidence
of responsiveness only in the net pay case. To shed light on mechanisms we
will then analyze the determinants of earnings response, and test if they are
consistent across tax types.
3 Institutional Details
Social security in Ireland is funded primarily funded through the Pay Related
Social Insurance (PRSI) system. PRSI is a tax with legal obligations on both
employees and employers to contribute. Contributions entitle workers to a
number of beneﬁts such as increased unemployment insurance. Eligibility for
these beneﬁts is based on the duration that the tax is paid, rather than the
number of euros paid. Thus, although taxes increase with income, because
PRSI is largely an `in or out' system, beneﬁts are essentially independent of
income. In this respect PRSI has elements of redistribution between workers
rather than an actuarially fair insurance system.
The legislation speciﬁes the shares of total contributions (statutory inci-
dence) that are to be borne by the employer and the employee. Section 13 of
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the Social Welfare Consolidation Act states:
The employer shall, in relation to any employment contribution, be
liable in the ﬁrst instance to pay both the employer's contribution
comprised therein and also, on behalf of and to the exclusion of the
employed contributor, the contribution comprised therein payable by
the contributor.
This legal text asserts that remittance of both employer and employee contri-
butions is the responsibility of the ﬁrm, but that the ﬁrm may subtract the
employee contribution from gross wages. The implication is that the employee
contribution is administered as a reduction in the worker's net pay while the
employer contribution, which has a separate schedule of rates, is to be added
to the ﬁrm's gross costs.
Like most social insurances taxes the PRSI system is progressive, with
marginal rates increasing as income crosses thresholds from one weekly pay
band (or subclass) to another. Two unique features of this system are at the
heart of this paper, however. Firstly, crossing these thresholds does not just in-
crease marginal rates, but also triggers substantial lump sum liabilities. These
discrete jumps in tax liability  what the literature commonly calls `notches'
 provide extremely strong incentives to report earnings just below these
thresholds. Following Saez (2010) and Chetty et al. (2011), a large literature
has investigated the extent to which agents `bunch' near these thresholds. The
amount of bunching, the excess mass of agents reporting incomes just below
these thresholds relative to just above, reveals the extent of the responsiveness
of taxpayers to the tax (Kleven and Waseem, 2013). Bunching estimators can
be used to infer the elasticity of earnings, with the extent of the bunching
positively related the elasticity of earnings.
Secondly, these notches apply diﬀerentially to the employee and employer
shares of total PRSI contributions. That is, statute not only induces these
notches, but also speciﬁes whether the notch should be administered through
an increase in gross costs (employer contribution) or through a decrease in
net pay (employee contribution). Figure 1 illustrates a hypothetical example
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Figure 2: Graphical depiction of accounting eﬀects of hypothetical e50 em-
ployee and e100 employer notches.
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Illustrative Effects of Employee and Employer Notches
of the eﬀects of this diﬀerential treatment. The ﬁgure shows the relationship
between wage payments made by an employer and the take-home pay of the
employee. At an employee notch, which in the ﬁgure is located at e200, the
take-home pay of the employee drops by the amount of the tax (e50), but the
cost to the employer is unaﬀected. In contrast, the notch at e350 sees the
cost to the employer increase by the amount of the tax (here, e100) but does
not change the net pay of the employee. Of course this scenario depicts an
accounting exercise, not behavioural responses.
The experimental design of this paper relies on the fact that the notched
element of these thresholds apply diﬀerentially to the employers' tax and the
employees' tax. In particular, this paper will investigate if responsiveness dif-
fers between employee notches and employer notches. The null hypothesis
motivated by standard theory is that statutory incidence does not aﬀect be-
haviour. Of course the prediction of Section 2 is that there will be a greater
response to taxes based on reductions in net pay.
The full list of notches and liabilities associated with them is outlined in
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Table 1.
Table 1: Outline of notches and tax penalties for crossing threshold
AX (Employee) AL (Employer)
Year Threshold Notch amount Threshold Notch amount
2005 287 6.40 356 8.01
2006 300 6.92 356 8.01
2007 339 8.48 356 8.01
2008 352 9.00 356 8.01
2009 352 9.00 356 8.01
An example helps clarify the information presented in this table. In 2007,
earning e0.01 over e339 per week (e17,628 per year) pushed an employee into
Subclass AX. This increased the PRSI marginal tax rate from 8.5% to 12.5%,
but more importantly triggered a e8.48 per week (e440 per year) lump-sum
penalty in the employee share. Notice that the tax increase applied to the
employee share. The legal requirement of the ﬁrm was to implement this tax
through a decrease in net pay. In accounting terms, their gross costs were
entirely unaﬀected.4
In contrast, earning anything above e356 per week (e18,512 per year)
pushed an employee into Subclass AL. This increased the PRSI marginal tax
rate from 12.5% to 14.75%, and triggered an e8.01 per week (e416 per year)
lump-sum penalty  but this time on the employer share. That is, unlike the
previous example, the statutory incidence of this threshold fell entirely on the
ﬁrm. In legal terms, this tax was to be paid through an increase in gross costs,
not a reduction in net pay.
Standard Marshallian analysis would suggest that the statutory incidence
of these notches should have zero impact on the behaviour of ﬁrms. In the
Marshallian framework, the equilibrium will be an adjustment of prices and
quantities independent of whether the tax is accounted as an increase in gross
cost or as a reduction in net pay. The theoretical analysis in Section 2 showed
4Beyond the notional increase in liability from a 1 cent pay increase, of course.
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that this does not hold in the neighbourhood of notches, and additional `new'
adjustment behaviour is expected for the net pay case.
4 Data Description
The data in this paper are an administrative panel of employee tax returns
for Ireland, with access provided under a conﬁdentiality agreement with the
Central Statistics Oﬃce (CSO). CSO acts as an intermediary for collating
relevant data from various state agencies. The primary source are tax returns
from the Irish Revenue Commissioners. These data contains the details from
the P35 tax form. This is comparable to a W-2 in the United States in that it
is the ﬁrm's statement of payments made to an employee, and the amount of
tax withheld and remitted to the IRS. This is an advantage of the dataset, as
it is income reported by a third-party (the employer, who faces additional legal
ramiﬁcations for mis-reporting) rather than data populated by the employees
themselves. Self-employed people are subject to self-assessment. The income
ﬁgure is formally called Taxable Pay. The P35 form includes both the ﬁrm's
ID and the individual's social security number, and with these CSO merges in
ﬁrms' form of incorporation and four-digit industrial sector; the year of birth,
sex, and nationality of individuals; and ﬁrms' number of employees, number
of hires, and number of separations. The data come in the form of a random
sample of 10% of all individual tax returns, which are reported by the employer
annually. It is a representative sample of the universe of workers.
Two variables generated from the dataset are the employee and employer
dominated regions dummy. Consider an employee who faces an additional e8
tax liability by earning one cent above a certain notch threshold. It should be
immediately clear that the employee is strictly better oﬀ reporting earnings just
below that threshold than by earning any income in the range of the threshold
and e8 above. Earning in the region is clearly in a tax disadvantaged portion of
the income distribution. We thus deﬁne the dominated region dummy variable
equal to one if the employee reports an income in that e8 interval. Earning
below that threshold is a tax-advantageous income. We deﬁne, somewhat
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Table 2: Summary statistics from administrative data sources
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
Employee Dom. Region 27,326 0.65 0.48 0 1
Employer Dom. Region 28,119 0.76 0.43 0 1
Age 934,171 35.59 12.71 16 85
Irish 934,171 0.67 0.47 0 1
Male 934,171 0.47 0.50 0 1
EU 2004 934,171 0.14 0.35 0 1
52 weeks 934,171 0.46 0.50 0 1
Construction industry 934,171 0.07 0.25 0 1
Hotels and Restaurants 934,171 0.11 0.32 0 1
Public Sector 934,171 0.19 0.39 0 1
Agriculture 934,171 0.02 0.13 0 1
Public body 934,171 0.10 0.30 0 1
Sole Proprietorship 934,171 0.13 0.33 0 1
Any self-employment income 934,171 0.03 0.18 0 1
arbitrarily, reporting a tax-advantaged income as earning within e3 of the
threshold per week without crossing it. Formally,
Dominated Region =
1 if income in dominated region0 if income ∈ (Threshold-e3, Threshold]
The dominated region variable is generated analogously for the employer
notch. Though analogous, it is important to important to note a subtle dif-
ference between the clearly-dominated region from the employee's perspective
and the likely-suboptimal region from the employer's perspective. Due to the
increased tax liability, an employee whose earnings are just above the notch
threshold is substantially more expensive than the same worker who simply
works marginally fewer minutes. It seems unlikely that the marginal prod-
uct of the worker is high enough to recoup the additional hundreds of euro in
taxes in those few minutes. Though unlikely, we cannot say with certainty that
this represents suboptimal behaviour on the part of the employer. Without
knowledge of the ﬁrm's costs, it is possible this is still proﬁtable for the ﬁrm if
the marginal product of labour is extremely high. For convenience we ignore
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this possibility and continue to refer to crossing this threshold as suboptimal
behaviour.
5 Empirical Analysis
The primary empirical question in this paper is whether taxpayer behaviour
depends on whether the tax statutorily falls on the employee or the employer.
This question is teased out in three separate approaches below.
Firstly, we investigate the extent of bunching just below the thresholds.
This approach, pioneered by Saez (2010) and others, measures if there exists
excess mass of earnings just below the notch thresholds. We will do this both in
terms of the absolute number of people reporting earnings at the threshold and
in terms of changes in the number. The latter is a method to alleviate concerns
about a preference for round-numbers. As alluded to above, we do indeed ﬁnd
diﬀerential responses between employee notches and employer notches.
Secondly, to investigate potential channels to explain the diﬀerent levels of
avoidance, we investigate whether the characteristics of bunchers diﬀer signiﬁ-
cantly from those who do not. This approach comprises regressions predicting
whether an individual reports earnings just above versus just below a notch
threshold. We ﬁnd that the determinants (e.g. nationality, age, sector, ﬁrm
size) of earning just below the threshold are diﬀerent from those just above,
as expected.
Thirdly, we will compare these determinants across notches. We will ﬁnd
that employee characteristics (e.g. age, nationality, any self-employment in-
come) are predictors of employee-focused notches, but not employer-focused
notches. The dataset spans from 20062013 but large reforms introduced the
Universal Social Charge in 2010 which aﬀected PRSI structures. Furthermore
notes Hargaden (2018) overall taxpayer responsiveness declined considerably
during the recession. Consequently, we focus our attention on a tight window
of 20062009 to minimize the eﬀect of cyclical changes or policy reforms on
behaviour.
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5.1 Bunching estimates
Our ﬁrst empirical analysis on statutory incidence investigates if the extent
of bunching diﬀers between employee and employer notches. The work on
bunching near kink/notch thresholds is now very large, for example Ramnath
(2013), Bastani and Selin (2014), Kleven and Waseem (2013), Saez (2010),
Sallee and Slemrod (2012), Best and Kleven (2018), Onji (2009), Mortenson
and Whitten (2015).
Below we plot ﬁgures of the income distribution near the notch thresholds.
In particular, these ﬁgures represent the weekly earnings in e2 bins for each
year of our analysis. The solid red line represents the threshold for crossing
into Subclass AX, which causes a discrete jump in employee contribution. We
thus call this the Employee notch. The dashed green line is at the threshold
for Subclass AL, crossing which triggers an increased liability for the employer,
and thus we call this the Employer notch.
Figure 3: Excess bunching graph in the ﬁrst full year of data
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Figure 3 shows large spikes, or bunching, at several points in the income dis-
tribution. There is clear evidence of bunching just below the employee notch.
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We approximately 1100 people reporting an income that avoid the penalty as-
sociated with crossing that threshold, whereas the income distribution would
suggest closer to 500 would be expected to earn within that e2 band, implying
an excess mass of approximately 1100 − 500 = 600 people responding to the
tax incentives. Similarly, we see a considerable (but smaller) spike to the left
of the employer notch, with approximately 800 − 600 = 200 more people ap-
parently reporting earnings just below the threshold than would be expected
looking at comparable bins.
Figure 4: Bunching (Levels)
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Figure 4 shows bunching graphs for all years between 2006 and 2009 inclu-
sive. The results are weak for 2007, but quite striking for 2008. In that year,
the AX and AL notches converged to within e4 per week of each other. In
this case, both the employer and employee could lower that statutorily deﬁned
contribution with a relatively small adjustment in earnings. It is thus not sur-
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prising that we see a large response to the notch thresholds in this year. This
eﬀect persists in 2009, as demonstrated in the bottom right-hand panel.
However, it is impossible with this approach to compellingly disentangle
tax-inspired bunching from round-number bunching when looking at ﬁgures
like those above. For example, the large spike at e300 could be simply a pref-
erence for paying in multiples of one hundred. To overcome this confounding
problem, we employ a diﬀerent identiﬁcation strategy. In contrast to Fig-
ure 4, the panels below use a diﬀerence-in-bunching estimator. This approach
combines the beneﬁts of the bunching estimator with a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
framework. Rather than plot the level (or number) of people in a particular in-
come bin, the diﬀerence-bunching estimator looks at the change in the number
of people in that income bin. Of course, just like regular diﬀerencing tech-
niques, this approach comes at the cost of us losing the initial time-period's
observation.5 Figure 5 demonstrate the bunching in diﬀerences rather than
levels. Absent changes in the size of the labour force, the diﬀerence-bunching
estimator should be mean zero. The implication of this approach, somewhat
like diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences, is that any deviations from zero near tax thresh-
olds are attributable to the tax avoidance and not round-number bunching.
In 2007 we see a spike of (approximately 180) people responding to the
tax treatment. This is a cleaner form of identiﬁcation for the tax eﬀect, as
opposed to a round number eﬀect. The identiﬁcation assumes that the taste
for round numbers is constant through time. Conditional on the taste for round
numbers not shifting between 2006 and 2007, we can attribute these changes
to tax incentives. Notice that unlike the bunching evidence in levels, we do not
see much of a reaction for the employer threshold in 2007. We conclude that
what was previously interpreted as a tax eﬀect is better considered a round
number eﬀect.
In 2008, when the notches are only e4 apart, we see yet another large spike
in extra people (this time close to 200) responding to the tax incentives. This
5For this paper, that year is 2005. Although not strictly included in the dataset, previous
year's earnings are available for the 80% of workers are continue employment with the same
ﬁrm in both 2005 and 2006. The diﬀerences graphs for 2006 are calculated using this
subsample.
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Figure 5: Bunching-in-Diﬀerences
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is quite strong evidence, and it occurs when a single small response could avoid
both employer and employee tax notches. However the spike of approximately
200 people above expectations is only of the same magnitude as at the employee
spikes in 2006 and 2007. That is, there is little evidence of additional bunching
when the employer notch is also relevant. Speciﬁcally, this is consistent with
a simple continuation of employee tax-oriented responsiveness.
We see little evidence of responsiveness in 2009 when the recession hit
Ireland's labour market. This result mimics the ﬁndings of Hargaden (2018),
which ﬁnds substantial cyclicality in responsiveness at other notches in the
Irish income tax system.
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5.2 Determinants of Bunching
Given that we observe diﬀerences in the extent of bunching between employee
and employer notches, it is pertinent to ask what is driving it. Who is doing the
bunching? Is it possible to decompose the determinants of responsiveness into
sensible predictors? For example, are workers in cash-based industries such
as construction better at avoiding taxes than equivalent workers whose pay
comes directly from government? Such analysis has been done before in other
countries, e.g. Slemrod et al. (2001), Advani (2017). However these studies
are based on ex post audits of tax returns, whereas this analysis is predicting
avoidance behaviour separately for employee- and employer-targeted notches.
Inspired by the determinants found in Slemrod et al. (2001) and Advani
(2017), we focus analysis on a list of plausible predictors of reporting a tax-
advantaged income. We start with a relatively large list of covariates and will
later use techniques developed by Belloni et al. (2014) to narrow the list down.
These initial variables are listed in Table 3 and are broken down by whether
the characteristics relate to the employee or employer. Summary statistics
were presented in Table 2 above.
Table 3: Suite of potential determinants of tax avoidance
Individual Characteristics Firm Characteristics
Age Construction sector
Sex Agriculture sector
Irish citizen Hospitality sector
EU-2004 citizen Public Sector
Any self-employment income Sole-proprietorship
Same-ﬁrm 52 weeks a year Public body
The variables are age, sex, Irish national, national of the EU 2004 accession
states, a dummy for any self-employment income, a dummy for whether the
individual worked for the same ﬁrm for ﬁfty-two weeks of the year, construc-
tion, agriculture, hotels and restaurants, and public sector dummies, the legal
form of incorporation of the ﬁrm (sole-proprietorship or other), and a dummy
variable for whether the employer is a semi-state company. The majority of
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these indicators are self-explanatory, but some may require justiﬁcation. Sex
is included earlier studies have found women have more elastic labour supply
responses than men (Bargain et al., 2014). The base category for citizenship
is non-Irish/non-EU 2004 citizen, the majority of which are UK citizens. The
prior expectation is that Irish citizens have better knowledge of the tax code
than UK citizens, and that citizens of newly admitted EU countries (who are
almost certainly recent migrants to Ireland) have less knowledge. The base
category for industry is retail; it is expected that cash-based sectors like con-
struction will have less tax compliance (and thus more avoidance) than retail,
and that public sector bodies will have less responsiveness to tax incentives.
Following Hargaden (2018) we suspect the ﬂexibility of labour market con-
ditions (such as the availability of overtime hours) could vary over the business
cycle, and thus we want to be sure the determinants are similar in the early
periods (20062007) and the Great Financial Crisis recessionary period (2008
2009). The analysis of Tables 4 and 5 test this, by estimating regressions for
the early 20062007 period and for the complete 20062009 period. The ﬁrst
table of results shows the coeﬃcients from an OLS regression on whether an
individual reports an income below (Y = 0) or above (Y = 1) the relevant
threshold. The ﬁrst column of results relates to the employee notch, and the
second to the employer notch. Unsurprisingly, given our ﬁnding of more bunch-
ing at the employee notch, the predictors of responding to this notch appear
more signiﬁcant than the employer notch.
The most signiﬁcant predictors for the AX notch are working for the same
ﬁrm ﬁfty-two weeks of the year (about 4.8% less likely to cross threshold),
working in the construction sector (also less likely, by 7%), working in the
public sector (7.7% more likely), working for a sole-proprietorship (13% less
likely), and having self-employment income (8.6% less likely). Reassuringly,
the signs on the coeﬃcients across speciﬁcations are comparable, e.g. working
ﬁfty-two weeks of the year (usually a pre-condition for being salaried) lowers the
probability of paying the AX (employee) tax by 4.8% and the AL (employer)
tax by 3.2%. However, there is less signiﬁcance for the employer speciﬁcation
than for the employee. This is not surprising, as we have already noted that
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Table 4: Determinants of reporting above notch thresholds, 20062007
(1) (2)
Employee (AX) notch Employer (AL) notch
Age (Decade) -0.0070 -0.014∗∗
(0.0052) (0.0049)
Irish 0.0048 0.017
(0.016) (0.015)
Male -0.011 -0.011
(0.013) (0.011)
EU 2004 0.035 0.027
(0.019) (0.017)
Fifty-two weeks -0.048∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗
(0.014) (0.012)
Construction sector -0.070∗∗ 0.027
(0.022) (0.020)
Hotels & Restaurants 0.00019 -0.011
(0.017) (0.015)
Public Sector 0.077∗∗∗ -0.012
(0.021) (0.019)
Agriculture -0.025 0.00073
(0.044) (0.041)
Public Body 0.022 0.051∗
(0.029) (0.026)
Sole-proprietorship -0.13∗∗∗ -0.027
(0.015) (0.015)
Self-employment income -0.086∗ -0.15∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.038)
Constant 0.72∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.022)
Year FEs Yes Yes
Observations 6,503 7,195
Adjusted R2 0.037 0.007
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there appears to be greater manipulation around the employee notch.
Table 5 presents a similar picture to Table 4, but this time the period of
interest is expanded to include the whole 20062009 period. As the regres-
sions in Table 5 have approximately twice as many observations as in Table
4, it is not surprising that the likelihood of discovering a statistically signiﬁ-
cant result in increased. What is crucial is that the marginal eﬀects are not
markedly diﬀerent through time. For example, the statistical signiﬁcance of
the estimated eﬀect of working in the construction sector has changed from
the 5% level to the 1% level, but the coeﬃcient change (from -0.07 to -0.088) is
within one standard deviation and so the conclusions from the ﬁrst column in
Table 5 continue the narrative from Table 4. We ﬁnd although many variables
are insigniﬁcant, certain individual characteristics (e.g. nationality, number of
weeks worked, any self-employment income) and ﬁrm characteristics (e.g. sec-
tor, and form of incorporation) are good predictors of tax avoidance behaviour.
Further, we ﬁnd less statistically signiﬁcant results on the employer side.
5.3 Seemingly Unrelated Estimation
The evidence presented above suggest that the mechanisms for greater respon-
siveness are diﬀerent for employer and employee taxes. However, it is plausible
that the statistical insigniﬁcance could be driven by having too many explana-
tory variables in the regression. Just as there is an argument for including
a full suite of variables when trying to understand the determinants of tax
avoidance, there is an argument to be made for keeping regression equations
parsimonious. The search for `robust determinants' of behaviour is particu-
larly appropriate if one is comparing across diﬀerent outcomes: how sensitive
are the results to the variable selection method? Thus in addition to the de-
terminants shown above, we also exploit the lassoShooting procedure in Stata
to apply the Double-Lasso method (Belloni, Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2014;
Urminsky, Hansen and Chernozhukov, 2016). The Double-Lasso method, as
suggested by the name, is a LASSO estimator that iterates through multiple
possible speciﬁcations until it settles on what it considers the `best' set of co-
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Table 5: Determinants of reporting above notch thresholds, 20062009
(1) (2)
Employee (AX) notch Employer (AL) notch
Age (Decade) -0.0030 -0.015∗∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0035)
Irish 0.017 0.011
(0.011) (0.011)
Male -0.014 -0.0082
(0.0086) (0.0082)
EU 2004 0.047∗∗∗ 0.021
(0.012) (0.012)
Fifty-two weeks -0.039∗∗∗ -0.0088
(0.0089) (0.0086)
Construction -0.088∗∗∗ 0.017
(0.015) (0.015)
Hotels & Restaurants -0.0100 -0.017
(0.011) (0.011)
Public Sector 0.069∗∗∗ -0.022
(0.014) (0.013)
Agriculture -0.076∗∗ -0.0079
(0.029) (0.030)
Public Body -0.0027 0.061∗∗
(0.020) (0.019)
Sole-proprietorship -0.14∗∗∗ -0.012
(0.011) (0.011)
Self-employment income -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.028)
Constant 0.70∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.017)
Year FEs Yes Yes
Observations 13,994 13,515
Adjusted R2 0.036 0.005
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variates. This approach isolates the variables that provide the most robust
statistical signiﬁcance given an atheoretic/ﬂexible approach to prediction.
Table 6: Double-Lasso variable selection, Employee (AX) notch
Variable Post-Lasso Marginal Eﬀect
Male -.0206
EU 2004 .0395
Construction sector -.0632
Public sector .0371
Sole-proprietorship -.1920
Self-employment income -.0924
Table 7: Double-Lasso variable selection, Employer (AL) notch
Variable Post-Lasso Marginal Eﬀect
Sole-proprietorship -.0379
Table 6 shows the covariates chosen by the Double-Lasso method as the
most robust predictors of the Employee (AX) notch, and their associated
marginal eﬀects. We can see that both the signs and coeﬃcients on the vari-
ables are consistent with this suggested by the Linear Probability Model, for
example the construction sector indicating about a 6.3% decrease in the prob-
ability of crossing the notch threshold. We can also see that Double-Lasso,
a ﬂexible approach that is not driven by theoretical priors, focuses in on six
variables to predict employee responses. These variables include both charac-
teristics of the individual (e.g. sex, nationality) and also characteristics of the
ﬁrm (e.g. sector, form of incorporation).
Table 7 performs the identical procedure as Table 6 but on the Employer
(AL) notch. It is immediately apparent that the variable selection varies enor-
mously from that suggested in Table 6. Unlike the results there, which indicate
a relatively large number of variables (both ﬁrm-based and employee-based)
that predict responsiveness to the notches, Table 7 suggests that only a single
variable  the form of incorporation (sole-proprietorship vs. other)  robustly
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predicts responsiveness. No characteristic of the individual, such as national-
ity or even their self-employment status, predicts reporting earnings below
the notch threshold. The channels by which avoidance occurs diﬀers between
employee- and employer-focused incidence.
The fact that predictor variables diﬀer between employer- and employee-
taxes provides initial evidence that mechanism of avoidance diﬀer between
employers and employees. However, what about the determinants of response
in a pooled sample? Taking both AX and AL notches together, does the
Double-Lasso method provide a sensible variable selection algorithm? Tables
8 and 9 investigate this. Firstly, Table 8 presents regression results on the
pooled AX and AL sample, and also on a larger sample that includes other
notches. As a major focus of this paper is the eﬀect of statutory incidence, these
additional notches (A1 and S subclasses) are not directly comparable to the
AX and AL notches. However, if we are simply ﬁnding robust determinants of
responsiveness, then including these notches improves the precision and power
of our estimates.
Applying the Double-Lasso method on this broader set of notches that in-
cludes over 60,000 observations, we ﬁnd a similar set of robust determinants
of earnings response. In particular, the variables include both individual char-
acteristics (age, and self-employment status) and ﬁrm characteristics (sector,
and form of incorporation) as the strongest predictors of response. As this list
of variables is chosen from the largest set of notches, we proceed with some
further analysis taking the choice of these variables as the `best' predictors of
tax avoidance.
With this set of `best' predictors, we now re-run the determinants of cross-
ing the AX (employee) and AL (employer) thresholds with these predictors as
covariates. Tables 10 and 11 are similar regressions to those presented earlier,
but with two key diﬀerences. Firstly, the set of covariates is determined algo-
rithmically by the Double-Lasso operator on the full set of available notches.
Secondly, the tables include an explicit test of whether the coeﬃcients in these
regressions systematically diﬀer from each other. These is achieved via Seem-
ingly Unrelated Estimation. This procedure is comparable to a Hausman test
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Table 8: Determinants of reporting above various notch thresholds
(1) (2)
AX or AL AX, AL, A1, or S
Age (Decade) -0.0081∗∗∗ -0.0067∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0017)
Irish 0.0087 0.0082
(0.0063) (0.0052)
Male -0.0073 0.0000033
(0.0049) (0.0041)
EU 2004 0.036∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.0073) (0.0062)
Fifty-two weeks -0.017∗∗∗ -0.0036
(0.0050) (0.0041)
Construction -0.029∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗
(0.0098) (0.0079)
Hotels & Restaurants -0.019∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(0.0066) (0.0059)
Public Sector 0.018∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.0076) (0.0064)
Agriculture -0.044∗∗ -0.048∗∗
(0.017) (0.015)
Public Body 0.029∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.0087)
Sole-proprietorship -0.13∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗
(0.0067) (0.0058)
Self-employment income -0.088∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.011)
Constant 0.78∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.0096)
Year FEs Yes Yes
Observations 43,119 60,279
Adjusted R2 0.037 0.028
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Table 9: Double-Lasso variable selection, any notch
Variable Post-Lasso Marginal Eﬀect
Age (decade) -.0088
Public Sector .0270
Public Body .0370
Sole-proprietorship -.1190
Self-employment income -.1434
comparing ﬁxed eﬀects models to random eﬀects models. In the Hausman
test, one checks if the coeﬃcients in the diﬀerent models are systematically
diﬀerent and thus if the RE model varies from the FE model. Here, we start in
Table 10 by checking if the pre-recession AX coeﬃcients are diﬀerent from the
20082009 coeﬃcients. The test is summarized by the χ2 statistic displayed
towards the bottom of the table, with its associated p-value. A high χ2 (and
thus low p-value) would reject the null of equivalent coeﬃcients over the two
time periods.
Tables 10 and 11 demonstrate that the robust, ﬂexibly-selected determi-
nants of crossing any notch are consistent, within notch, over time. Table
10 shows the determinants for the Employee AX notch in both the pre- and
during-recession periods, and although the coeﬃcients are not identical, there
is not much evidence from the χ2 that the determinants are systematically
diﬀerent, namely a p-value of 0.34 fails to reject a null that the determinants
are statistically equivalent. Table 11 presents comparable information for the
Employer AL notch. Again, the determinants are largely similar in both direc-
tion and magnitude, and a formal test of equivalent coeﬃcients is not rejected
(p = 0.36). These null results are reassuring, as there does not seem to be sys-
tematic diﬀerences within notches through time. The structural relationship
appears consistent regardless of the time period.
However, we can also test whether the coeﬃcients from Tables 10 and 11
are diﬀerent from each other. Just as we found that the variables chosen by
the Double-Lasso method diﬀered between notches, testing if the coeﬃcients
between Tables 10 and 11 are diﬀerent is inherently a test of whether the
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Table 10: Determinants of crossing AX threshold on Lasso-selected variables,
by time period
(1) (2)
2006 and 2007 2008 and 2009
Age (Decade) -0.012∗ -0.0023
(0.0049) (0.0046)
Public Sector 0.084∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.018)
Public Body 0.016 -0.032
(0.029) (0.028)
Sole-proprietorship -0.14∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015)
Self-employment income -0.12∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.033)
Constant 0.72∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017)
Year FEs Yes Yes
Observations 6,503 7,491
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.023
χ2 on null of equivalent determinants 5.68
p-value 0.34
determinants of responsiveness diﬀer between notches. As above, this proce-
dure will produce a test-statistic that follows a χ2 distribution. The results
overwhelmingly reject the null of equivalent coeﬃcients. Comparing within-
notch coeﬃcients produced test-statistics around 5.5 and p-values around 0.35.
Comparing between-notch coeﬃcients produces a test-statistic of 218.4 and a
p-value of less than 0.0000: the determinants are hugely diﬀerent. Even when
using the list of variables algorithmically chosen from a large set of notches, the
channels that determine earnings responses are enormously diﬀerent between
the employee-notch and employer-notch.
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Table 11: Determinants of crossing AL threshold on Lasso-selected variables,
by time-period
(1) 2
2006 and 2007 2008 and 2009
Age (Decade) -0.018∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.0046) (0.0048)
Public Sector -0.012 -0.028
(0.019) (0.018)
Public Body 0.048 0.074∗∗
(0.026) (0.028)
Sole-proprietorship -0.024 0.0074
(0.014) (0.016)
Self-employment income -0.16∗∗∗ -0.062
(0.038) (0.040)
Constant 0.79∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.018)
Year FEs Yes Yes
Observations 7,195 6,320
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.003
χ2 on null of equivalent determinants 5.44
p-value 0.36
6 Conclusion
This paper provides theoretical and empirical evidence that statutory inci-
dence matters in ways not previously thought. We investigate incidence for
tax notches, discontinuities in schedules which are ubiquitous across a wide
range of tax and nontax settings (Kleven, 2016). We show that the textbook
incidence results do not hold for the case of notches.
For notches, taxes on net pay diﬀer from dollar-equivalent taxes on gross
costs. When notch thresholds are deﬁned by the employee net pay, there can
be no seamless transition to the standard equilibrium because those conditions
do not constitute an equilibrium. Absent this default transition, both sides of
the market can improve outcomes by adjusting earnings to avoid taxes.
Economists have arguably been too quick to assume the generality of clas-
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sical results on statutory incidence. A growing literature has provided consid-
erable empirical evidence questioning the applicability of these results. Chetty
et al. (2009) introduced the importance of tax salience; Saez et al. (2012) found
ﬁrms were reluctant to treat young and old workers diﬀerently; Lehmann et al.
(2013) suggest sticky wages mitigate equilibrium responses; and Kopczuk et
al. (2016) found diﬀerential evasion possibilities imply incidence is a function
of the remitter. We show that incidence matters when tax schedules contain
discontinuities.
Exploiting a natural experiment in Ireland where notch thresholds diﬀer for
employee and employer contributions to the social insurance tax, we ﬁnd earn-
ings respond to both employer-focused and employee-focused taxes, but not
equivalently. There is a stronger response to taxes that are statutorily placed
on the employee. Decomposing the earnings response by characteristics of the
employer and characteristics of the employee, we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerence in the drivers of responsiveness. Although both the employer-
and employee-earnings response seem consistently stable, with little empiri-
cal support for inter-temporal eﬀects, there is overwhelming evidence that the
responses are diﬀerent between employer taxes and employee taxes. As dead-
weight losses are functions of behavioural responses, policymakers wishing to
minimize the distortions from taxation should place statutory incidence at the
level that minimizes response.
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